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Abstract 
 We investigate whether gender can be considered as part of the corporate governance structure, and 
accordingly its real impact on  corporate performance. Based on our analysis of 21,382 European companies 
and 2,159 ones in the UK, we focus on the impact of mandatory female percentages, (pink-quotas), based on 
the proposed EU-Directive, which aims to push female representation toward their natural percentage of the 
home population. We find that gender explains differences among the corporate governance solutions as 
adopted at national level. This fact holds regardless of whether the specific country has already adopted any 
regulation in accordance with the EU proposal. In fact, governance choices are more rooted into the country 
culture, although the single national governance schemes differentiate whether the managerial roles are mainly 
covered by females or males. The EU-Directive appears to be unable to reduce the gaps between the schemes 
of governance adopted across the EU, as there is no economic incentive to do. Indeed, gender and governance 
do contribute to capital intensity of EU-Companies and their funding, only, as suggested by previous literature 
but has no impact on corporate ROI or its persistence. Surprisingly far from it, we find out that female gender 
attracts more equity capital, regardless of the operating risk level. However, there is evidence that in the 
unregulated UK market, gender does influence ROI. 
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1. Introduction 
Women represent 49.556% of the Human World population, according to The World Bank 
Dataset2. While some specific countries have huge predominance of males (e.g. Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Maldives, Equatorial Guinea, Bhutan, Western 
Sahara, according to The Times’ statistics3), the female share is higher if you consider the most 
developed countries. Europe has 52.95%, according to the UN-DESA statistics4, as direct 
consequence of the very high female percentages in Eastern Europe. The Business World makes all 
another story: gender discrimination is a common mindset. Statistics (e.g., from ILO5) confirm huge 
under-representation of the female share of population.  
Is this mismatch a direct consequence of cultural backgrounds, only, or is it related to any sad 
economic rule? This paper demonstrates that gender discrimination in business is very linked to the 
lack of efficiency in corporate governance structures. Since no economic advantage is produced by 
superior governance through gender solutions, no rigid regulation on gender quota seem capable to 
reduce such a discrimination, except perhaps in the UK. 
Advanced civil societies are getting more and more aware about gender discrimination and its 
cultural backgrounds, although their business world appears a bit laggard on this topic. Accordingly, 
several countries are introducing new regulations to fight gender discriminations in business. In fact, 
they impose minimum levels of the female representation (sometimes known as “pink quotas”) for 
the key bodies of corporate governance. In the European Union, a specific proposal of Directive 
imposes an initial threshold of 20% of female representation, while a path toward higher “pink-
quotas” is also planned for the forthcoming years, to match the natural gender composition in the long 
run.  
 
2 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?end=2017&start=1960&view=chart 
3 http://m.statisticstimes.com/demographics/countries-by-sex-ratio.php 
4 https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/ 
5 https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/multimedia/maps-and-charts/enhanced/WCMS_458201/lang--en/index.htm 
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The EU proposal inflated debates on the real efficacy of forcing behaviours through 
regulation, particularly in critical cultural factor as gender discrimination in business. In fact, many 
opinion leaders suggest that mandatory quotas contribute to reduce the efficiency sourcing from 
genuine (unregulated?) selective processes. At the time being, few countries had a early adoption of 
the EU-proposal; among them: France, Italy and Spain. Other lead-countries (e.g., Germany) appear 
to be late in the adoption process, while some others still trust on the self-assessment capability of the 
corporations (e.g., U.K.) to appoint their key roles. Very special cases are the Eastern European 
countries, suffering from above normal shares in female population but missing the regulation from 
the EU. By comparing results achieved by the first movers with those from all the others you may 
have insights about the real causes of the delays in implementation and the sources of the gender 
discrimination in business.   
This paper aims to detect, beyond gender equality, whether gender could be considered as part 
of the comprehensive picture of the corporate governance and its real impact onto the corporate 
performance, being it direct or indirect in its nature. We are particularly interested in finding out 
whether the pink-quotas may contribute to explain differences among the concrete corporate 
governance solutions, as adopted in different (regulated and non-regulated) countries. Moreover, 
although companies compete more and more on a global chessboard with different governances, we 
are also interested to detect whether the different gender quotas might impact over the corporate 
performance, including the capability to deal with financial markets and institutions.  
Discussions on the true impact of corporate governance onto the corporate performance are 
widely diffused both among academic circles and the professional practice. Converging conclusions 
seem to concentrate on very few topics: (i) there is no optimal model of corporate governance to refer 
to the corporate performances. Indeed, while economics is becoming more and more global, still the 
corporate governance structure seems to be more correlated to local features; (ii) the true economic 
reasons of low correlations between adopted corporate governance and deployed corporate 
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performance are unclear, particularly as far as the direct/indirect nature of the relationships are 
concerned. In fact, on one hand, you do not have a unique optimal model of governance to refer, since 
governance relates to firm-specific characteristics (e.g., country of incorporation, dimension, 
industry, etc.). On the other hand, any inefficiency might deploy more in short-term performance to 
the long-term one, so that any empirical evidence connecting long-term governance and short-term 
performance might be biased; (iii) corporate governance is a complex mix, therefore you cannot 
measure its standards through a unique indicator. This makes it more complicated to carry on 
quantitative research on the efficiency and effectiveness of any adopted governance structure; 
introducing pink-quotas does not simplifies. This paper attempts to overcome potential bias on the 
above key points by using long-term data across 10 countries. 
Differing from previous literature contributions, this paper follows a comprehensive approach 
to depict the corporate governance (Cremers et Al., 2016) instead than focusing on one specific 
element, only. This approach is getting more and more preferred, since any positive relation with one 
specific element of the governance might be offset by the negative contribution to any others. Indeed, 
the multivariate relationship puzzle is a critical point to drive real decisions on corporate governance, 
given the unexpected impacts over the long-term sustainability of the corporate performance.  
Furthermore, the multivariate approach to corporate governance makes possible the detection 
of any missing component to include into the governance framework. In this paper, we investigate if 
gender and pink quotas may impact over the relationship between governance and performance at 
corporate level. Therefore, if the gender contributions to corporate bodies can be intended as a 
component of the corporate governance which could impulse the long-term corporate performance.  
The paper firstly demonstrates that gender matters in defining the actual corporate governance 
framework, particularly when a comprehensive approach is adopted. This result is found by testing 
the significance of differences for seven key corporate governance indicators between subsamples 
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with a higher presence of females vs. those with a higher presence of males. The analysis is conducted 
for 7 EU-countries with different degrees of adoption of the Directive plus the UK as benchmark.  
Secondly, we test gender-quota as the missing link between governance and operating 
performance at corporate level. We compared the relationships among indicators of governance 
choices and corporate performance (as measured by the persistent return on investment, ROI) when 
the different female percentages (those proposed by the EU-Directive proposal) are achieved. To have 
a clearer picture of results we also investigate the relations with the operating invested capital, only. 
In fact, the impact over the capital intensity seems to be more effective than the one on operating 
profitability.  
The effect on capital intensity thirdly leads us to investigate the gender (quotas) as the missing 
link between governance and the capability to raise either debt or equity capital. Indeed, women in 
boards attract more equity capital, when no relevant differences in business risks are reported. On one 
hand, the more intensive equity contribution suggests that female directed companies pay higher cost 
of capital. On the other hand, it could signal the superior capability of women to self-assess the 
business risk and to choose the right capital. In both cases, the missing evidence on bias could be 
direct of the matching of the two, by showing (apparent only) no bias.  
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 illustrates the research hypothesis according to the 
inner literature basics on the appraisal of the corporate governance models, particularly when gender 
is considered. Tentative analysis of the relationships between the adopted governance and the 
corporate performance are also designed here, based on the EU-Directive proposals. Section 3 depicts 
the adopted research methodology to investigate our research hypothesis and discusses the empirical 
evidence arising from the EU-Countries. Section 4 concludes.  
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2. Can you consider gender as part of the corporate governance structure?  
This paper is inspired by Moro et al. (2017), who focused on the creditworthiness issue and 
the related possible gender discrimination. They found that they could not exclude women self-
selection, because they felt they could be rejected due to their gender. Moreover, their lower self-
confidence, compared to men’s, might lead to a higher credit restriction. Similarly, Mijid and 
Berknasek (2013) proposed a model of credit rationing according to the gender of the business 
owners. Their key contribution is about self-rationing solutions adopted by women rather than a bank 
discrimination. Indeed, both the above papers do not clarify if the reduced bank allowances are solved 
through real capital rationing or an increase of equity capital.  
Mantovani and Castellan (2015), analysed whether the corporate governance profile really impacts 
on the firm performance and the bank allowances. They found a persistent significance of the relation 
linking corporate performance and massive contribution of human capital into the corporate process, 
particularly at managerial and ownership levels. Neither the firm’s performance nor its perception by 
investors give evidence of improvements. So, human capital may be considered as the key element 
that is lacking in the different models of the firms together with the models of bank allowances. 
Indeed, human capital contributes to more efficient decision making and increases creditworthiness.  
The efficiency of the decision-making process can also be direct consequence of the actual mechanics 
of the key corporate bodies. Adams et a. (2010) run a survey of the literature on board of directors to 
detect the actual impact of the decision process they adopted. They conclude that both the selection 
process of the directors and the board composition matter on the relationship among board actions 
and firm performance. Literature review provides several studies that suggest the existence of positive 
relationship among the structure of the corporate governance and the firm performance (Brickley et 
al., 1994; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Drobetz et al. 2003; Gemmill and Thomas, 2004; Hossain et al., 
2001; Laoworapong et al. 2018; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
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Weisbach,1988; Williams, 2000). This is also found by Claessen et al. (2002), who stated that better 
corporate governance frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of 
capital, better performance and more favourable treatment of all participants. Chen et al. (2008) give 
thorough insights on the relation existing among ownership concentration (a key element of the 
corporate governance framework) and performance. Margariti et al (2010) get to similar conclusions 
demonstrating the actual role of ownership concentration on capital structure and corporate finance. 
Furthermore, in the research made by Donaldson (2003) concluded that good corporate governance 
could augment investors’ confidence and market liquidity. Moreover, as stressed in the OECD 
principles (2004), an efficient and effective corporate system has the power to lower the cost of capital 
and encourage firms to use resources to push growth. The consequences of better corporate 
governance will be higher firm value and more profitable firm performance. This is also expected, 
because governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the 
different stakeholders in the corporation, such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders, 
creditors, and so on. 
In this paper, we challenge to deepen the above matters, by investigating the gender connection to 
corporate governance and its relationships with long-term corporate performance (both at operating 
and financial level). Particularly, we are interested to understand whether gender can be considered 
as: (i) one of the transmission channels of the indirect relations between corporate governance and 
performance; (ii) a component of the overall corporate governance structure which helps to explain 
the direct relation with corporate performance.  
Literature is focusing more and more on the “critical mass” (Kramer et al., 2007) and the 
consequences of applying different percentages of women in management roles. Particularly, it 
remains unclear if gender quotas must be intended as part of the comprehensive governance structure 
of a firm or if they have direct impact on the overall corporate performance. In fact, having a low 
presence of women in the board and considering boards that might include only one woman in the 
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management staff or Board of Directors (BoD) might lead to wrong perceptions of the women labour. 
Since women who are a single female component may feel as tokens, considering Boards with more 
or three women might show more positive effects and influences on good governance.  
On this specific topic, there is still a huge gap to fill, since minor researches have been developed 
further by crossing and matching the above research efforts. This why this paper focuses on the ways 
the presence of women in managerial bodies may affect governance and performance, by 
investigating the experiences from EU Countries on the adoption of the EU-Directive proposal on the 
“pink-quota”. First, we want to observe the relationship of governance and gender considering also 
different percentages of women presence in BoD, through the following hypothesis: 
H1: Governance differentiates whether management roles are mainly covered by females or by males. 
We conduct all the analyses on different countries, in order to understand whether relationships are 
affected by external environment, the cultural framework and the different economic situations may 
also affect the way women deal with business choices when acting in their management roles.  
Indeed, there are a few articles that emphasize the potential of women as managers inside 
organizations, making them innovative, productive and profitable (Rosener, 1997).  Another research 
by Buttner and Moore (1997) found that more and more women tend to start new companies by 
themselves, to balance family and work responsibilities; furthermore, their measure of success is self-
fulfilment, while profits are less substantial. On the other hand, the role of women inside an 
organization is affected by the fact that they do not yet have enough influence inside an organization; 
this last research may lead to the thought that, as women have different influence inside an 
organization, this may also affect the type of governance chosen by women to carry on a business. 
Researches also focus on the value of having gender diversity in Boards: indeed, women members 
may have a symbolic value for changing women’s issues of recruitment; however, Van Der Watt and 
Ingley (2003) find that this is not sufficient to create efficient corporate boards, but people must be 
selected according to their experiences and effectiveness, in the mix of diversity. Finally, Adams and 
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Ferreira (2009) indicate that gender-diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring, although they 
find out that the relationship among gender diversity and performance is negative. The introduction 
of mandatory gender quota might reduce the firm value for “well-governed” firms.  
This paper distinguishes from previous studies by explicitly considering the threshold levels of the 
gender quotas according to the EU-Directive proposal. We try to understand if the unclear conclusions 
from previous literature relate to tests based on non-qualified gender quota to the corporate 
performance. Therefore, we establish our second research hypothesis: 
H2: Gender-quota enforces the relationship between corporate governance and their performance. 
After controlling for gender influences on the performance of the firm, we would also like to analyse 
whether gender may influence the capital structure by focusing on the different gender capabilities to 
attract equity and debt capital. As analysed by Bellucci et al. (2010), in small business lending, female 
entrepreneurs face more difficult access to credit even if they do not pay higher interest rates. They 
also found in their research that the gender of the loan officer matters, because female ones are more 
risk-averse. However, there are previous studies that have analysed whether prejudice related to 
gender characteristics exists in the credit market, but results differ according to different data used: 
Blanchflower et al. (2003); Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998); and Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), who 
used US data, tested whether women who act in small businesses do not encounter discrimination; 
while Muravyev et al. (2009), who relied on European and Asian data, claim that female entrepreneurs 
do face discrimination. However, there is also difference in terms of the race of the person who is 
asking for credit, because as Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) highlight, African-Americans have to 
face further difficulties. Moreover, as found in a recent research conducted by Moro, Mantovani and 
Wisniewski (2017), which considered data from 13 countries, women-managed firms receive less 
credit because they are less likely to ask for it and not because they are exposed to higher perceived-
discrimination. Credit allowances are often distributed inefficiently because the banking system is 
constraint in the adoption of affordable rating systems (Mantovani et al. 2013). Women tends to 
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prevent any inefficiency in the debt-capital allocation through by adopting a self-selective process in 
submitting requests for banking allowances as suggested by Mijid and Berknasek, 2013. Ongena and 
Popov (2015) examine the existence of a casual effect of the gender bias to bank credit, by concluding 
that female-owned companies are discouraged to apply for bank credits. Indeed, few empirical 
researches aim to detect if any reverted capability to attract Equity-capital offset bias from the Debt-
capital markets. This leads to our research hypothesis n. 3. 
H3: The capital structure of a firm is affected by the gender influences on capital attractiveness. 
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3. Research Methodology and empirical results 
We opted for a comprehensive approach in assessing corporate governance, by recurring to the widest 
possible set of quantitative indicators to support the research effort. To prevent any risk of self-
assessment, we decided to adopt ready-made indicators on the corporate governance, as sourced from 
ORBIS database (edited by Bureau van Dijk). Such a database permits us to source homogeneous 
corporate financial data to use in our research, as well. The sample under investigation was sourced 
for seven countries within the European Union which demonstrated interest to the adoption of the 
gender Directive. It includes: (i) France, Italy and Spain as first movers in the adoption of specific 
national laws on gender according to the EU-Directive; (ii) Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany and 
Slovakia, which are now getting in. Data from the United Kingdom were also extracted to have 
peering evidences. The comparison with the U.K. is useful since the country has no specific rules on 
gender, a more market-oriented financial system (if compared with banking-oriented systems in 
continental Europe) and it is exiting the EU. Unfortunately, no other useful countries could be 
considered for comparison (e.g. Norway or US), provided the insufficient set of joint (i.e. governance 
and financial) data included into the sourcing database. For the same reason, some EU Countries (e.g. 
Poland or Netherlands) were not included in the sample.  
The selected sample is made of firms from different Countries having detailed data on the gender 
composition of their legal bodies matched with a full set of the following data: (i) at least 4-years of 
continuous panel financial data, which are required to compute the persistent performance of 
corporations; (ii) seven indicators to depict the comprehensive governance of each company, each 
one providing different pieces of information about the elements of the type of governance which 
distinguishes each firm. All indicators are sourced from ORBIS database, although sometimes they 
were partially manipulated to permit further econometric treatments as follow: 
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1. Ownership concentration (OC) transforms the original BvD Independence Index into a 
numerical figure where the lower the numeric variable, the less the ownership concentration6. 
A low value of this variable suggests a better governance; 
2. Presence of a manager in the ownership structure (PM) is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if there is a manager in the ownership structure. We hypothesize that in terms of good 
governance practices, the presence of a manger in the ownership structure is indication of 
better governance quality. 
3. Team size (TS) is the number of people involved with the management of the firm and is 
constructed by taking into account the size of the firm (larger firms requiring larger teams by 
nature). We assume that the higher the adjusted team size, the better the governance practice; 
4. One manager (OM) is a variable constructed as a dummy, where the value equals 1 if the 
company is managed by one person only. In our opinion, it is important for a good governance 
that the firms are managed by a team and not by a single person; 
5. CEO duality (CEOD) is another dummy variable. It equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board. We think that it is important for a good governance that the roles of CEO and 
chairman of the board of directors are performed by two different persons; 
6. Board of director independence (BoDi) is constructed as a dummy where the value equals 1 
if there are two or more managers on the board of directors. It would be preferred if managers 
were not on the BoD; 
7. Board of director size (BDS) counts how many people are present in the BoD and it is adjusted 
by the firm size. We hypothesize that the higher the adjusted BoD, the better the governance. 
We must underline that such seven indices are all punctual in nature. This does not bias any further 
empirical evidence, since any governance picture is direct consequence of the wide lengths of time 
 
6 Original data from BvD-Orbis database express the index with letters (from A, low concentration to D high 
concentration). This makes very difficult any econometric treatment of the data. In the paper we substitute letters with 
figures from 1 to 4, with no other changes on the original data and methodology. 
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 50% F 50% M 40% F 60% M 30% F 70% M 20% F 80% M
CZECH REPUBLIC 296 1977 317 1977 487 1579 584 1524 2108
GERMANY 50 618 92 586 161 542 305 480 785
SPAIN 832 3110 916 2923 1144 2738 1486 2578 4064
FRANCE 793 3491 1211 3037 1859 2420 2717 1861 4578
HUNGARY 140 687 156 581 216 512 303 446 749
ITALY 524 3895 722 3783 1071 3620 1727 3388 5115
SLOVAKIA 699 3698 728 3223 994 2938 1129 2854 3983
UNITED KINGDOM 395 1340 510 1341 691 1299 919 1240 2159
COUNTING
TOTAL
required by all corporate cycles to lead to a specific equilibrium. Indeed, this makes the governance 
framework much more stable over time and requires them to be compared with persistent corporate 
performance over the long run. 
The sampling process selected 23,541 companies as at December 31st, 2017. 21,382 of them are EU-
corporations, while 2,159 are from the United Kingdom. The UK-companies will serve as a 
controlling group. Table 1 reports the counting and the sample break-down based on the different 
thresholds of gender representation into the bodies of the corporation. The different sub-sets were 
separated according to the percentage of women inside the Board of Directors, based on the different 
levels as proposed by the European Directive: 20% of female-F (this being the initial threshold issued 
by the Directive proposal vs. the male-M quota), 30% (as the next threshold issued by European 
Union), 40% (indeed the next compulsory F-level). Finally, the 50%-real gender composition of the 
World population was also considered, as natural and ideal balance. 
Table 1: Number of firms composing the sample under investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data are exposed according to the different minimum “pink-quota” of the overall key legal bodies. 
Figures in table 1 are strongly influenced by the actual availability of data into the database according 
to the legal framework of data disclosures in different Countries. This is the case of Germany which 
deploys a very low quantity of firms into the sample since its legal framework makes mandatory full 
data disclosure only for companies with a more structured legal organization (e.g. presence of 
auditors). On the other side, Italy has a mandatory disclosure for any incorporated corporate bodies 
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which are not partnerships. Since our main research focus is on the relations between gender and 
governance, we used data without any sample treatment for the economic relevance of the countries. 
Tables 2 Panel A to G show descriptive statistics - Country by Country - for each indicator, as split 
into the four subsets according to the critical thresholds of female percentage. Eight figures are 
reported for each line/indicator, distinguishing between female-driven and male-driven companies. 
Therefore, the complete Country-set is made of 56 means twinned to their 56 standard deviations, to 
give a clearer view of the adopted corporate governance. Finally, table 3 compares average figures 
for all the EU-companies (panel A) to facilitate any comparison with the UK-companies (panel B). 
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Table 2, Panel A to G: Mean and Standard Deviation for each governance characteristics for EU- countries (Czech Republic, Spain, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia). 
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A quick comparison of figures in table 3 highlights immediately two corner approaches to the overall 
governance framework, as adopted in the EU and in the UK. In fact, EU-Countries have higher 
ownership concentration and superior presence of a manager in the ownership structure, while UK-
Companies present superior figures for the remaining 5 indicators. A more careful detection indicates 
that the differences among the two distinguished approaches to governance are not gender sensitive. 
In fact, EU-companies maintain larger ownership concentration and presence of manager in the 
ownership structure whatever the threshold of female presence. Same evidence is for the rest of the 
indicators in the UK-companies.  
Descriptive statistics of EU-Countries are everything but homogeneous. While Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia present figures even more distant from UK than average-EU, evidences from 
other countries appear more controversial, meaningless the adoption of the EU Directive proposal. In 
fact, Italy (directive-adopter) is unexpectedly nearer to UK for any of the 7 indicators, while Spain 
(directive-adopter) and Germany (pending-adoption) approaches the UK standards for 5 indicators 
and the EU average for 2 indicators. Finally, France (directive-adopter) has a reverted position: 5 
indicators are nearer the EU average, while the rest is toward the UK standard. Still, the gender 
percentage seems very ineffective, provided that any of the above trends are confirmed at any 
threshold level (except 13 rare cases over the 392 possible comparisons of the average data). Similar 
evidence when you compare standard deviations at Country level with the EU average data: the sign 
of the differences is gender insensitive out of 8 cases (over the 392 possible comparisons); 2 (over 
56) for the UK data. 
According to descriptive statistics, by including the pink-quotas no homogenised governance 
frameworks emerges among the European Countries. Therefore, the possible reception of the EU-
Directive on pink-quotas by the Countries also appears as unable to reduce the gaps among the 
schemes of governance. This leads us to investigate about the existence of other reasons underpinning 
17 
 
the above picture of the gender-to-governance relationship, by sourcing insights from business 
economics. A more sophisticated analysis of the gender contribution is therefore required7.  
 
Table 3 : Mean and Standard Deviation for each governance characteristics for EU-countries (Panel A) and UK (Panel B) . 
 
We tested the gender-driven differences in the adopted governance structure (H1) by comparing the 
distributions of each indicator among women-led and men-led companies, country by country. For 
each Country under analysis, we run several t-test of differences between the distributions of the sub-
samples defined by the threshold percentage of female presence in the boards. Four tests were run for 
each indicator at country level, i.e. 28 tests for each Country. It results 224 tests, overall: 196 for the 
EU-Countries and 28 for the UK. T-tests were arranged so that the lower the p-value, the higher the 
gender contribution to differentiation the single indicator. 10% threshold was adopted to accept the 
hypothesis of gender differentiation. 
T-tests at Country level confirm H1, along with the intuitions from descriptive statistics: the adopted 
corporate governance structures differentiate from the nation-specific model whether the managerial 
roles are mainly covered by females or by males. Results give evidence that governance structures 
are really influenced by the gender of people with a leading role in the firm. In fact, 106 tests (54.08%) 
 
7 One possible way forward is to try to directly establish a link between gender and corporate performance. Many authors 
have shown  clear links between top management, institutional ownership, shareholder activism and performance. These 
studies include Jensen and Murphy (1900), Smith (1996), LaPorta et al. (1999), Gillian and Starks (2000), and Chen et al 
(2005). It would not be surprising to find some clear evidence involving female representation and corporate performance. 
However, that could be one of the issues addressed in our future research. 
MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M) MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M) MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M) MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 3.61 1.11 3.65 1.10 3.63 1.11 3.66 1.09 3.66 1.10 3.65 1.09 3.68 1.10 3.64 1.10
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.27 0.33 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.34
TEAM SIZE 1.98 1.56 2.23 2.25 2.09 1.68 2.26 2.28 2.21 1.82 2.27 2.30 2.37 2.16 2.27 2.28
ONE MANAGER 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.20
CEO DUALITY 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.14 82.79 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.15
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.20
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 1.07 1.20 1.03 1.32 0.90 1.32 1.06 1.34 0.97 1.33 1.08 1.35 1.09 1.40 1.09 1.35
MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M) MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M) MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M) MEAN (F) ST.DEV (F) MEAN (M) ST.DEV (M)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 2.39 1.61 3.07 1.40 2.52 1.60 3.07 1.40 2.73 1.55 3.05 1.41 2.90 1.49 3.03 1.43
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.28 0.36 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.34 0.14 0.27 0.20 0.32 0.15 0.27 0.16 0.29 0.15 0.27
TEAM SIZE 8.47 9.60 8.35 17.42 8.85 12.03 8.35 17.42 9.30 14.51 8.15 17.37 10.00 18.66 7.92 17.03
ONE MANAGER 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.38 0.85 0.36
CEO DUALITY 0.08 0.45 0.05 0.38 0.09 0.56 0.05 0.38 0.08 0.50 0.05 0.38 0.06 0.43 0.05 0.39
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.38 0.85 0.36
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 3.31 3.08 1.10 1.89 3.12 2.94 2.21 2.17 2.78 2.66 2.25 2.19 2.56 2.46 2.30 2.22
PANEL B
UNITED KINGDOM
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
PANEL A
7 EU COUNTRIES 
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
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report significant p-values in EU-Countries, while 13 tests (46.43%), only, were favourable in the 
UK. Indeed, gender cannot help to uniform governance in the EU-Countries. 
More insights on the contribution of gender-quotas to the overall corporate governance picture comes 
from discussions of the results from the tests at Country level. In fact, they are not homogenous among 
countries, while differences in governance characteristics are significant for each Country, possibly 
as direct consequence of the evolution of the regulating process under adoption. Detailed results are 
reported in table 3 panel A to I. EU-Countries differentiate according to the longer period of adoption 
of the EU-Directive framework proposal: 58.33% is the average percentage for the 3 leading countries 
vs. 50.89% for the 4 laggard ones. The leading countries deploys unexpected high rate for Italy (22 
tests, 78.57%) and France (17 tests, 60.71%), while Spain is much lower (10 tests, 35.71%), even 
lower than the UK benchmark case. In the laggard countries, Germany is above average (16 tests, 
57.14%), very near to the French evidence, while it must be considered for the impacting role such 
its economy inside the EU. Furthermore, the above data let us observe that regulating gender quotas 
really impacts on governance differentiation, while larger economies seem more sensible in gender 
for governance choices than the smaller ones.  
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50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.32
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00
TEAM SIZE 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.00
ONE MANAGER 0.25 0.25 0.36 0.42
CEO DUALITY 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.16
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 0.25 0.25 0.36 0.42
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.33 0.10 0.07 0.04
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.12
TEAM SIZE 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.04
ONE MANAGER 0.19 0.47 0.13 0.19
CEO DUALITY 0.31 0.03 0.09 0.12
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.19 0.47 0.13 0.19
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.29 0.12 0.01 0.00
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.01 0.02 0.36 0.00
TEAM SIZE 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00
ONE MANAGER 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.00
CEO DUALITY 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.00
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.00
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.36
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00
TEAM SIZE 0.18 0.13 0.46 0.17
ONE MANAGER 0.42 0.45 0.28 0.12
CEO DUALITY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.42 0.45 0.28 0.12
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.00
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.08
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.27 0.41 0.07 0.00
TEAM SIZE 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.00
ONE MANAGER 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.40
CEO DUALITY 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.35
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.40
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.01 0.10 0.39 0.00
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TEAM SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.06
ONE MANAGER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
CEO DUALITY 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.19 0.20 0.39 0.04
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.48 0.40 0.11 0.00
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.00
TEAM SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ONE MANAGER 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
CEO DUALITY 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.00
50F-50M 40F-60M 30F-70M 20F-80M
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
PRESENCE OF A MANAGER IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34
TEAM SIZE 0.86 0.48 0.12 0.01
ONE MANAGER 0.59 0.48 0.21 0.10
CEO DUALITY 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.58
BOARD OF DIRECTOR INDEPENDECE 0.59 0.48 0.21 0.10
BOARD OF DIRECTOR SIZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
PANEL G
SLOVAKIA
T.TEST
PANEL H
UNITED KINGDOM
T.TEST
PANEL E
HUNGARY
T.TEST
PANEL F
ITALY
T.TEST
PANEL C
FRANCE
T.TEST
PANEL D
SPAIN
T.TEST
PANEL A
CZECH REPUBLIC
T.TEST
PANEL B
GERMANY
T.TEST
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A to H: T-tests results 
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Tables 4, Panel A to H cross national and gender differentiations to highlight any cultural approach 
in gender which have impact on the adopted corporate governance combination. You can visualize 
such background differences by considering the orientation of the significant cases inside the tables. 
Italy is a clear example of vertical orientation, since the gender differentiation deploys its impact on 
the entire set of corporate governance indicators. Moreover, the repeated vertical vectors of 
significant results are proof of the irrelevance of the threshold level in pink-quotas to differentiate the 
governance indicators.  UK is the opposite case of horizontal orientation, which suggests the impact 
of gender is on some specific items (i.e. indicators), only, of the overall corporate governance. The 
persistency of significant p-values among the thresholds (e.g., ownership concentration or board of 
director size) is direct consequence of the systematic differentiation that gender contributes to the 
governance solutions in this Country. 
Czech-Republic, Hungary, Spain and Slovakia belong to the horizontal-orientation family, while 
France and Germany present a mix of the two orientations. The French case is very particular, since 
the clear vertical impact of gender at the lower tier (20%-80%) is direct consequence of the switch 
over the second tier of regulation (30%-70%) as imposed by the EU-Directive. In the meanwhile, the 
gender contribution to differentiate governance is more evident for the size of teams and boards, as 
the horizontal array of significance p-values demonstrates for these two indicators. The German case 
is similar to the French one for sizes, but it also reports a significant horizontal impact on “ownership 
concentration” and “presence of a manager in the ownership structure” (similarly to the UK case). 
---§--- 
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To investigate H2, we search for the influences of the adopted corporate governance on the Return 
on Investments (ROI). To focus on the persistent performance of the firm, the 4-year averaged ROI 
was considered, as proxy. Control of results were done also by checking the relation to the average 
intensity of the Operating Invested Capital (vs. total revenues). In fact, it is well known that a superior 
operating performance may arise either from larger mark-ups percentages or thinner capital intensity. 
This control also helps to catch the transmission channels of gender to the operating performance.  
We started by running OLS regressions among ROI as dependent variable and the seven indicators 
of the overall governance as independent variables. Regressions were run country by country, with 
no gender consideration, as Eq [1] explains: 
[1] 𝑅𝑂𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆) 
The same regressions were run, by using the (intensity of the) operating invested capital as dependent 
variable. The same independent variables as in Eq [1] were used at Country level. Eq [2] explains: 
[2] 𝑂𝐼𝐶
𝑅𝐸𝑉
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆) 
Detailed results from regressions are reported in the appendix, section 1. Table 5, panel A summarizes 
the counting of significant coefficients found in each EU country (out the constant) and compare them 
with the UK evidence.  
No EU countries highlight significant relationships between governance and the long-term operating 
performance, except the Czech Republic, while in the UK 5 elements of 7 (i.e. 71.43%) are relevant. 
More significant relationships can be found for the Operating Invested Capital. The Czech Republic 
still deploys three indicators although two of them, only, are overlapped (“presence of a manager in 
the ownership structure” and “Team Size”). The figure for significant coefficients lets us conclude 
that the OIC is the main source of the relationship among governance and operating performance in 
that country. France and Italy also deploy more significant coefficients for the OIC, while Hungary 
has one, only. Indeed, the two Latin countries have controversial signs of the coefficients which may 
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contribute to understand why no final impact of the ROI is found. By comparison, UK shows a 
reduced number of significant coefficients for OIC, with reverted signs compared with those for ROI.  
Table 5-A suggests that EU-countries has no economic incentive to use the governance as a 
competitive tool as it happens in the UK. This evidence suggests that the relationship between 
governance and performance is stronger where regulation on governance is reduced and a 
comprehensive approach in setting the governance is adopted.  
The next step of investigation for H2 is to understand if gender may influence (hopefully: improve) 
the above relationships. Therefore, we expanded the set of independent variables, by including a 
dummy variable for the gender character of the company (GEN=1 female, GEN=0 male).  
Eq [1*] and [2*] explain 
[1*]𝑅𝑂𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆)+𝛽8(𝐺𝐸𝑁) 
[2*] 𝑂𝐼𝐶
𝑅𝐸𝑉
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆)+𝛽8(𝐺𝐸𝑁) 
To have a clearer picture of the impact of the pink-quotas, regressions including the gender dummy 
variable were run separately for the sub-samples as determined by the thresholds. Accordingly, 4 
regressions were run for each Country (28 overall in the EU, plus 4 for UK). 
Panel B in table 1 mimics panel A, deploying significant coefficients for regressions [1*] and [2*], 
detailed evidence is in appendix, section 2. When gender is considered, the percentage of significant 
coefficients in the EU countries jump to 10.71%. Spain (a leader in introducing the new EU directive) 
contributes a lot to the increase, while Germany and Hungary (laggard countries) give minor 
contribution, although positive. A slightly reduced percentage is for the OIC case, deploying more 
homogeneous results, except than for Czech Republic and France, where gender reduces the 
relationships. This is not the case of Italy. For the UK, the frequency of significant coefficients 
decreases both for ROI and OIC, when gender is considered. 
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We may conclude that the inner economic advantage arising by the adoption of the gender Directive 
is for the Spanish case, while the French experience suggests a superior control of the OIC as sourced 
by the gender Directive. The Italian case makes a very different story, the lower impact is direct 
consequence of the application of the Directive to larger companies, while SMEs are more diffused 
there. Still, the unregulated UK case suggests a very different story from the European experience. 
According to the above analysis we may conclude the following on H2: (i) governance and gender 
have minor impact over the operating performance of EU companies than UK ones; (ii) both gender 
and governance of EU companies relate more to OIC-intensity; (iii) an economic incentive to adopt 
pink-quotas exist for EU Companies, although it seems to impact more on the OIC relationship.  
---§--- 
The above empirical evidence leads us to investigate H3, provided that OIC must be funded attracting 
investors in Debt and Equity capital. We use similar regressions to those for H2 but focusing on the 
Intensity of Debt-Capital8 and the Intensity of Equity-Capital as dependent variables. The following 
equations describe 
[3] 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇
𝑅𝐸𝑉
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆) 
[3*] 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇
𝑅𝐸𝑉
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆)+𝛽8(𝐺𝐸𝑁) 
[4] 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌
𝑅𝐸𝑉
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆) 
[4*] 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌
𝑅𝐸𝑉
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐶) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑀) + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑆) + 𝛽4(𝑂𝑀) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷) + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑖) +
𝛽7(𝐵𝐷𝑆)+𝛽8(𝐺𝐸𝑁) 
Panel C extends table 5 with results from regressions [3] and [4] (details in appendix, section 3). 
Germany, Spain and Slovakia confirm the absence of relations between corporate governance 
indicators and the capital structure. Countries with some significant relationships vs. OIC extend it to 
 
8 Debt Capital was computed as Net Financial Position, by subtracting Cash from the overall financial debts. 
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capital structure, although higher significance is for the debt capital (18.37% significant coefficients) 
than the equity capital (16.33%). UK deploys a very tiny percentage of significant coefficients, much 
less than the case of operating performance. 
Data from panel C of table 5 let us understand the poor relation between governance and financial 
structure of the European firms, with a superior sensibility for debt capital. In the UK, the financial 
structure is more independent, therefore separated from the operating side (very related to ROI).  
Panel D of table 5 presents data as in panel C but computed including the gender dummy. Comparing 
figures from table 5 in panel D with those from panel D, a surprising contribute from gender emerges. 
In fact, the European firms deploy superior percentage of significance in the relationships with the 
equity capital, as offset by a reduced significance for the Debt Capital. Such an evidence is shared 
with the benchmarking UK case, where the relationships for the Equity Capital enforce too, when 
gender is considered. This leads to an important conclusion for H3: gender contributes to attract 
equity capital. 
Table 5: # of significant coefficients from regressions  
 
Panel A refers to regressions [1] [2]. Panel B to [1*] [2*]. Panel C to [3] [4] Panel D to [3*] [4*] 
Indeed, the European evidence in panel D of table 5 requires some more controls. In fact, on one hand 
we need to understand if the above relation on Equity relates to the risk profiles of companies (instead 
ROI OIC/REV ROI OIC/REV D/REV E/REV D/REV E/REV
CZECH REPUBLIC 3 3 13 8 3 1 9 8
GERMANY 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
SPAIN 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 2
FRANCE 0 3 0 9 3 2 9 8
HUNGARY 0 1 2 6 1 2 3 8
ITALY 0 4 0 16 2 3 8 12
SLOVAKIA 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 4
% of total 6.12% 22.45% 10.71% 19.64% 18.37% 16.33% 13.84% 18.75%
UNITED KINGDOM 5 3 17 12 1 1 5 6
% of total 71.43% 42.86% 53.13% 37.50% 14.29% 14.29% 15.63% 18.75%
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
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than the gender contribution to governance). On the other hand, it would be useful to know the 
strength of the actual percentage of the pink-quota may have in the enforcement of the Equity capital.  
We run several simple linear regressions, for each Country, using the effective percentage of female 
people of each firm as independent variable and the same dependent variables as in eq. [2], [3], [4]. 
One more regression tested the relation of the pink-quotas with the operating leverage9 as proxy of 
the operating risk. Table 6 depicts the p-values of the coefficients and the signs of the relationships. 
Operating risk never deploys significant relationship with the actual pink-quota for EU-firms. All P-
values are very high in every country under analysis, including those ones where the relationship 
among the pink-quota and Equity Intensity is significant (i.e. Germany, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia). 
Equity relevance is therefore uncorrelated with the corporate riskiness of female-led firms. 
This let us focus on the relations among the actual pink-quotas at firm level and the corporate 
performance. According to table 6, the adoption of the EU directive on gender is ineffective: in fact, 
some lead-adopting countries (France and Spain) shows no significant results at all, while the opposite 
is true for some other non-adopting countries (Slovakia and Hungary).  
The relationship with the Equity intensity is more relevant. Again, low reinforcement is shown from 
the adoption of a regulation coherent with the proposal of EU Directive. In fact, 4 countries over 7 
highlight significant relationships; three of them are among the non-adopting ones (Germany, 
Hungary and Slovakia), while Italy (a very special case according to previous analysis) is the fourth 
one. The Italian and German cases are also affected by a similarity: the Equity relationship is 
significant but the OIC relationship is not, although the P-value is very next to the threshold used to 
identify significance. For Hungary and Slovakia, instead, the Equity relationship connects with the 
importance of the OIC relationship.  
 
9 Operating leverage is the sensibility of EBIT to changes in revenues. It can be proxied as the ratio between the overall 
contribution margin of the corporation and the EBIT itself.  
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Table 6: controls for relations between pink-quotas and corporate performance 
 
No clear evidence can be sourced from the sign of the significant coefficients, as well. In fact, half of 
them are positive (Hungary and Slovakia) and half are negative (Germany and Italy). The evidence 
seems coherent with results from Margarati et al (2010), when gender is considered. This let us 
conclude that gender must be considered as a complementary element of the overall governance for 
Equity investors, therefore for the capital structure of the firms.  
 
 
 
OPL OIC/REV D/REV E/REV
Panel A
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.77 0.62 0.55 0.63
GERMANY 0.72 0.12 0.21 0.10
SPAIN 0.61 0.42 0.96 0.21
FRANCE 0.89 0.61 0.23 0.85
HUNGARY 0.91 0.04 0.62 0.05
ITALY 0.48 0.10 0.88 0.05
SLOVAKIA 0.97 0.03 0.02 0.07
UNITED KINGDOM n.s. 0.872 0.793 0.636
Panel B
CZECH REPUBLIC - + + +
GERMANY + - - -
SPAIN - - - -
FRANCE + - - -
HUNGARY - + + +
ITALY - - + -
SLOVAKIA - + + +
p-values of coefficients
signs of coefficients
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4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper aims to focus on three goals: (i) to analyse whether managers’ gender affects governance; 
(ii) to find out about the influence of gender on the relationships between governance and firms’ 
performance; (iii) infer about the capability of gender to influence the capital structure and the degree 
of attractivity provided from a specific company to Equity and Debt capital.  
We found that results differ significantly among the EU countries considered for the research with 
few consequences arising from the adoption of any mandatory pink-quotas. This is a consistent result, 
since the role of women in the socio-economic context differs according to the external environment 
and the cultural framework. No enforcing regulations seem capable to reduce such gaps. This may 
affect the way a woman takes decisions, even if the company they manage competes on an 
international scale. In fact, governance and ownership characteristics are different according to the 
gender of those holding the leading roles inside a firm, particularly as far as the capital intensity is 
concerned. Nevertheless, governance influences the firms’ performance more in women-led firms 
than in male-led ones. This is also true, even if the performance is adjusted by operating risk. 
Moreover, we have also found that for most of the countries, there are more women-led companies 
financed by Equity when they do not deserve credit. This is a gender related characteristic, indeed, 
provided that no significant gaps in operating risks may explain the gap. In fact, the gender influences 
the intensity of the invested capital in women-led companies and its financing as well. The higher 
intensity of Equity is signal of hidden bias in gender and finance as far as Debt capital is concerned. 
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Appendix 
This appendix includes all the regressions run according to the equations described in the paper. Section 1 
includes data for eq. [1] and [2]. Section 2 reports data for eq. [1*] and [2*]. Finally, section 3 states figure 
from eq. [3], [3*], [4] and [4*] 
 
Appendix Table A1 
 
Appendix Table A2 
 
  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE                                                                 
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R-square: 
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